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Abstract 
This paper develops a general approach to characterizing optimal income tax enforce­
ment. Our analysis clarifies the nature of the interplay between tax rates, audit prob­
abilities, and penalties for misreporting. In particular, it is shown that for a variety of 
objective functions for the principal the optimal tax schedule is in general concave (at
least weakly) and monotonic; the marginal tax rates determine the audit probabilities; 
and less harsh penalties lead to higher enforcement costs. Our results imply that there 
exists a tradeoff between equity and efficiency considerations in the enforcement context 
which is similar to that in the moral hazard context for tax policy. 
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1 Introduction
It is well accepted by now that informational asymmetries generate important constraints 
on the formulation of economic policy. An early and classic example is given by Mirrlees 
(1971) who considers the problem of optimal income taxation when individuals differ in 
their ability to transform effort into income. It is assumed that ability and effort of an 
individual cannot be observed at any cost, whereas income, which is the product of these 
two unobservables, is perfectly and costlessly observable. Taxes can thus depend only on 
final income. Under these informational conditions the equity-efficiency tradeoffs that 
constrain the choice of tax policies arise only because of the presence of moral hazard 
associated with taxation of income. If there were no moral hazard (i.e. individual efforts
and therefore incomes were exogenous) , the problem of optimal income taxation would
be a trivial one since, by assumption, individual incomes are perfectly and costlessly 
observable. In the presence of moral hazard the optimal taxes must strike the right 
balance between efficiency and equity considerations. 
In much of the recent literature on optimal income tax enforcement (Reinganum and
Wilde (1985) , Border and Sobel (1987), and others) ,  on the other hand, individual in­
comes are treated as exogenous, i.e., there is no moral hazard. 1 However, informational
constraints arise from another important consideration; namely: an individual's income 
cannot be directly observed; it can only be verified through a costly audit. In this setting 
the question of optimal tax policy takes a different form. Besides tax rates, a policy 
must include an audit strategy and a scheme of penalties or fines for misreporting. This 
*This is a revised version of Chander and Wilde (1992). We thank Kim Border, Luis Corchon,
Rajeeva Karandikar, John Ledyard, Dilip Mookherjee, Ignacio Ortuno-Ortin, Thomas Palfrey, Till Re­
quate and Kuna! Sengupta for helpful comments and discussion. We have also benefitted from a seminar 
presentation at Caltech. 
1 An extensive literature on income tax enforcement has developed since the contributions of Alling­
ham and Sandmo (1972) and Srinivasan (1973). Coweii (1990) provides a recent and relatively compre­
hensive review of that literature. 
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opens up additional interesting questions of optimal audit strategy, the nature of inter­
action between tax rates and audit strategy, and the role of penalties for misreporting. 
Although the traditional costs associated with moral hazard are absent, the issue of eq­
uity versus efficiency may not disappear but arise in a different way. Progressive taxes 
generate stronger incentives for individuals with higher incomes to underreport, thereby 
necessitating more auditing. Since audit expenditure is a direct resource cost, an opti­
mal policy must weigh the welfare benefits from more progressive taxation against the 
concomitant increase in audit expenditure. Therefore, as in the optimal tax problem of 
Mirrlees, the central question is: How progressive should the income tax be? 
Reinganum and Wilde (1985) propose a general formulation of the problem of optimal 
income taxation in the presence of costly enforcement . They compare a "random" audit 
strategy in which audits are independent of reported income to an "audit cutoff" strategy 
in which a taxpayer triggers an audit if and only if reported income is below some critical 
level. 2 By restricting attention to linear tax schedules, they show that a deterministic
audit cutoff strategy in which all income reports below a certain cutoff level are audited 
with probability one, and higher income reports are not audited is optimal. 3 Border and 
Sobel (1987) analyze a model which is identical to Reinganum and Wilde's general formu­
lation except that Reinganum and Wilde assume that income is continuously distributed 
over some non-negative interval and Border and Sobel assume that income takes a finite 
number of possible values. They show that optimal taxes are nondecreasing with income 
whereas optimal audit probabilities are nonincreasing.4 They emphasize that in general 
optimal audit strategies involve random auditing. Similarly, Mookherjee and Png (1989) 
are interested particularly in finding general conditions under which random auditing is 
optimal. In a related paper, Melamud and Mookherjee (1989) show that the principal 
may implement any optimal random audit strategy by delegating responsibility for au­
dits to an independent auditor. More recently, Cremer, Marchand and Pestieau (1990) 
analyze a model which is characterized by a linear income tax schedule and two-part 
audit probability strategy.5 Sanchez and Sobel (1993) analyze a model which generalizes 
Cremer, Marchand and Pestieau to arbitrary audit strategies. In summary, most of the 
existing literature on optimal income tax enforcement emphasizes properties of optimal 
audit strategies as opposed to those of optimal tax schedules. This is perhaps because 
only limited qualitative results concerning the nature of the optimal tax schedule have 
been obtained. In particular, unlike in the case of the optimal tax problem of Mirrlees, 
the question of progressivity of the optimal tax schedule has not been resolved. 
2 As noted by these authors, the foundation of their analysis was provided by Townsend's {1979) 
analysis of optimal verification strategies in insurance contexts. 
3Such audit strategies resemble debt contracts, provided the act of auditing is identified with 
bankruptcy, and have been shown to be optimal in other contexts also. See, for example, Dye {1986) 
and Morton (1986). Also see Border and Sobel's (1987) discussion of some specialized schemes and the 
issue of partial commitment. 
4 As noted by Krasa and Villamil (1993) these monotonicity results of Border and Sobel are important 
because they are consistent with certain stylized facts in insurance markets. 
5The model analyzed by Cremer, Marchand and Pestieau is closely related to the audit cutoff model 
analyzed by Reinganum and Wilde (1985), their primary innovation being the embedding of the optimal 
tax and audit problem into a conventional social welfare maximization problem. 
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In this paper we will characterize the optimal tax schedule in the presence of costly 
enforcement. We will also clarify the nature of the interplay between optimal tax rates, 
audit probabilities, and penalties for misreporting. 
We adopt the following model. The tax authority (principal) and taxpayers (agents) 
are risk neutral. The principal knows the probability distribution of income, but does not 
know who has what income, while each individual knows his own income. The principal 
may audit an agent in order to verify his income, but this is costly. The principal 
collects taxes from the agents through the following mechanism. The principal chooses 
schedules for pre-audit payment (tax) and post-audit payment (which for convenience we 
call penalty) and probability with which a message from an agent will trigger an audit. 
Each agent, treating the policy of the principal parametrically, sends a message so as 
to minimize his expected payment. We do not specify the objective function for the 
principal. Instead, as in Border and Sobel (1987), we introduce the notion of an efficient 
scheme such that for a variety of objective functions for the principal an optimal scheme 
must be efficient. Objectives of the principal could be to maximize gross revenue subject 
to a given limited auditing budget; to minimize audit costs subject to meeting some 
gross revenue target; to maximize revenue net of audit costs; or to maximize a Rawlsian 
social welfare function. For the case when the objective of the principal is to maximize a 
social welfare function, which reflects a concern for both equity and efficiency, an optimal 
scheme may be efficient, though this is not true in general. We thus characterize efficient 
schemes. 
Our main results are as follows. As in most analyses of the principal-agent prob­
lem, the revelation principle (Myerson (1979) ;  Harris and Townsend (1981)) holds. This 
means that without loss of generality we can restrict attention to incentive compatible 
direct revelation schemes. In an efficient scheme, the payment function is nondecreasing 
and concave, and the tax function is nondecreasing with nonincreasing average tax rates. 
The audit probabilities are nonincreasing. Only the downward incentive constraints are 
binding and the marginal payment rates determine the audit probabilities. An efficient 
scheme may involve either deterministic or random auditing, and there is really no quali­
tative difference between the two. We are also able to show that uniform lump-sum taxes 
are never optimal. 
These results are robust with respect to two significant extensions also considered 
explicitly in the paper. The motivation for these comes from the fact that in reality 
penalties are often constrained more than allowed in our model. We are able to show that 
the results stated above are unaffected if we impose on penalties exogenous constraints 
of 'horizontal equity' or 'punishment should fit the crime.' 
The major assumptions that limit our analysis are the following. As mentioned earlier, 
and, as in most of this literature, we rule out supply side effects of income taxation. 
Though supply side effects are important, we do not think that introducing them would 
reverse the qualitative nature of our results. As the results of Mirrlees (1971) show, these 
»T T • t" , 1 • • ,  t" , 1 , I ' 1 l l r'l 1 r'< 1 • w111 omy remrorce tne regress1v1ty or tne tax; payment scnearnes. vremer ana uanvan 
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(1993) analyze a model of optimal tax enforcement with moral hazard, but under the 
restriction that there are only two types of agents: skilled and unskilled. It is seen that 
their results, though limited, are not inconsistent with our results. Absence of supply 
side effects enables us to focus sharply on the enforcement problem and leads to a more 
transparent analysis. 
The other major assumption is that the individual agents are risk neutral. Mookherjee 
and Png (1989) consider a model in which agents are risk averse, and the principal selects 
taxes and audit probabilities to maximize a utilitarian welfare function. They show that 
the revelation principle holds and obtain results that are weaker than the monotonicity 
results of Border and Sobel (1987) , leaving open the question of monotonicity of optimal 
taxes and audit probabilities for the case with three or more possible income levels. 
Though this is the subject matter of a forthcoming paper by us, we describe the effect 
of risk aversion on our results later in the paper. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the model; Section 3 introduces the 
notion of efficiency; Sections 4 and 5 derive the results stated above; Section 6 makes the
concluding remarks. 
2 The Model 
We consider a population consisting of a continuum of taxpayers (agents) who are dis­
tinguished by a one-dimensional measure of income. The incomes of the taxpayers are 
distributed over a nonnegative interval, which for convenience we take to be [O, y], y > 0,
according to a probability density function g with g(y) > 0 for y E (0, y). 
We shall sometimes refer to a 'taxpayer with income y' simply as 'taxpayer y' or 'agent 
y'. 
A mechanism for the principal consists of a set M of messages; a function t : M -+ R, 
to be called the t ax function; a function p: M -+ [O, 1], to be called the audit function;
and a function f : M x [O, y] -+ R, to be called the penalty function. A taxpayer who
reports the message m to the principal is audited with probability p( m). In the event
that an audit does not occur, his payment to the principal is t(m). In the event that
an audit occurs, the true income of the taxpayer is discovered, and his payment to the 
principal is f ( m, y) where y is the true income of the taxpayer.
We assume that a taxpayer can never pay more than his true income.6 Therefore, 
in order to be feasible a mechanism must satisfy certain requirements. To begin with, a 
taxpayer of any given income must be able to submit a report that requires a payment 
which is not larger than his income. Define M(y) = { m E M : t(  m) S y} to be the set of
feasible messages for taxpayer y. Then the first feasibility requirement on a mechanism 
6)l./e later consider the implications of weakening this assumption. 
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is that for all y E [O, y], M(y) #- rjJ and J(m, y) ::; y for all m E M(y).7
We also assume that each taxpayer, treating the mechanism of the principal para­
metrically, submits a message to the principal so as to minimize his expected payment. 
Thus, taxpayer y minimizes (1 - p(m) )t(m) + p(m)f(m, y) , m E M(y) . The second fea­
sibility requirement on a mechanism is that the problem: minimize [(1 - p(m) )t(m) + 
p(m)f(m, y)], m E M(y), has a solution for each y E [O, y]. 
A mechanism is said to be a direct revelation mechanism if its message space is [O, y], 
and a direct revelation mechanism is said to be incentive compatible if it is optimal for 
each taxpayer to report his income truthfully. 
The Revelation Principle: Let (t,p, J) be some feasible mechanism. Then there exists 
an incentive compatible direct revelation mechanism ( t', p', f') which is equivalent from 
the point of view of the principal and each agent, when each agent reports his income 
truthfully. 
Even though the set of feasible messages for each agent depends on his true income, 
it is easily seen that this principle holds. Consequently, we can confine our attention to 
the class of incentive compatible direct revelation mechanisms that are described by the 
set of schemes ( t, p, f) that satisfy for each y 
t(y) ::; y; (1) 
f(x, y) ::; y for all x with t(x) ::; y; (2) 
and 
(1 - p(y))t(y) + p(y)f(y, y) ::; (1 - p(x) )t(x) + p(x)f(x, y) for all x with t(x) ::; y. (3)
These inequalities say that each taxpayer's expected payment is minimized if he reports 
his income truthfully. 
As in most analyses of the principal-agent problem, we assume henceforth that an 
agent reports truthfully if reporting truthfully is optimal. Thus, given a scheme ( t ,  p, f) 
that satisfies the inequalities in (1), (2) and (3), the expected gross revenue for the 
principal is 
hy r(y) g(y) dy, (4) 
7 Given that y E [O, y], an implication of this requirement is that there exists an m E 1VJ such that
t(m) � 0.
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where r(y) = (1 - p(y))t(y) + p(y)f(y, y) is the payment function. Observe that if 
f(y, y) > t(y) then we can increase t(y) and lower f(y, y) such that r(y) is unaffected. 
This will not affect the incentive constraints in (1) for agent y, and only weaken them 
for agents other than y. This means that f(y, y) should be as small as possible. Thus, 
without loss of generality we can take f(y,y) ::; t(y). Similarly, f(x,y), x =J y with
t(x) ::; y should be as large as possible which, in view of (3), is accomplished by setting 
f(x, y) = y for x =J y with t(x) ::; y. With some notational inconsistency let f denote the
function defined as f(y) f(y, y). Then in view of the observations just made, we may 
consider only those schemes ( t, p, f) that satisfy for each y the following inequalities: 
0::; p(y) ::; 1; (5) 
f(y) ::; t(y) ::; y; (6) 
and the incentive constraints 
r(y) = (1 - p(y))t(y) + p(y)f(y)::; (1 -p(x))t(x) + p(x)y for all x with t(x)::; y. (7)
Note that the set of schemes (t, p, f) that satisfy these inequalities is closed but not 
compact. We know from the literature on economics of crime prevention (Becker (1968); 
Stigler (1970)) that if the feasible set is not compact then an optimal scheme may not 
exist. One familiar way to get around this problem is to impose some exogeneously given 
bounds on the feasible set so as to make it compact. This is accomplished in the present 
context by requiring the penalty function f to be bounded below. Thus, (6) may be 
replaced by 
0::; f(y) ::; t(y) ::; y for all y. (8) 
This inequality together with (7) says that if a taxpayer reported truthfully and was 
audited, then he may be given a reward which is not more than the full tax rebate. 8 This 
rules out the possibility of making the enforcement costs arbitrarily small by offering the 
agents large rewards with small probabilities and thus inducing them to do what the 
principal prefers. 
Let Qi denote the set of all schemes that satisfy inequalities (5), (7) , and (8). We 
shall call Qi the set of all feasible schemes. 
8More generally (6) may be replaced by d::; f(y)::; t(y)::; y, where -oo < d::; 0 is some constant.
None of our results below depends qualitatively on the value of d. Leaving aside technicalities, other
social and economic argument can be given for which the penalty function j must be bounded. See, for 
example, Cremer, Marchand and Pestieau (1990) for a further discussion. 
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We now describe a subset of schemes that are of an independent interest. The moti­
vation for these comes from the fact that a scheme in Qi, may not satisfy the principle of
horizontal equity-the payments of otherwise identical taxpayers might be different. 9 The 
subset of schemes that satisfy the principle of horizontal equity is obtained by imposing an 
additional feasibility requirement on the principal's mechanism; namely: f ( m, y) 2 t(  m) 
for all m and y. The revelation principle continues to hold and the set of incentive 
compatible direct revelation schemes reduces to 
Q2 = {(t,p,f) E Qi: f =t} . (9) 
If (t,p, J) E Q2, then as seen from (7), r(y) = t(y) for all y, i.e., the payment and tax
functions are identical. 
3 The Efficient Schemes
What is the appropriate objective function for the principal? This is an empirical question 
for which no clear-cut answer is readily available. We thus consider a variety of objective 
functions for the principal. 
Let S be some subset of the feasible set Qi, i .e., SC:: Qi. We assume that other things 
being equal, the principal always prefers smaller audit probabilities as they reduce audit 
costs. 
A scheme ( t, p, f) E S is efficient in S if there is no other scheme ( t', p', J') E S such
that p' -<:: p, r' 2 r, and r' # r or p' # p, where r and r' are the payment functions
corresponding to (t,p, j) and (t',p', f'). That is, it is not possible to not increase the 
audit probabilities and raise the payment of a taxpayer without lowering the payment of 
some other taxpayer, and it is not possible to not lower the payments of taxpayers and 
decrease an audit probability without increasing some other audit probability. 
Note that the definition of efficiency does not involve the density function g. Thus if 
a scheme is efficient, it is efficient with respect to every g. 
If the objective of the principal is to maximize gross (expected) revenue subject to a 
given limited auditing budget, then clearly an optimal scheme must be efficient. 
A scheme ( t,  p, J) E S is audit efficient in S if there is no other scheme ( t', p', J') E S
such that JJ r'(y)g(y)dy 2 JJ r(y)g(y)dy, p' -<:: p, and p' # p where r and r' are the
payment functions corresponding to ( t, p, J) and ( t', p', J'). That is, it is not possible
9See Stiglitz (1982) for a discussion of horizontal equity in the context of optimal income tax problem. 
Ortuno-Orlin and Roemer (1990) forcefully argue in favor of horizontal equity on legal and ethical 
grounds. 
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to collect at least the same gross revenue by decreasing an audit probability without 
increasing some other audit probability. 
Border and Sobel (1987) note that for a variety of objective functions for the principal 
an optimal scheme must be audit efficient including when the principal may wish to 
maximize the sum of taxpayers' utilities subject to a net revenue constraint. Since, as 
can be shown, audit efficient schemes are efficient, it follows that for all those objective 
functions for the principal an optimal scheme must also be efficient. 
A scheme ( t, p, J) E S maximizes revenue net of audit costs in S if there exists no
other scheme (t', p', f') E S such that f! r'(y)g(y) dy- c J! p'(y ) g(y) dy > J! r(y) g(y) dy­
c f! p(y)g(y)dy, where r and r '  are the payment functions corresponding to (t, p, f) and 
( t', p', f') and c > 0 is the cost per auditrn 
Clearly, a net revenue maximizing scheme in S must be efficient in S.11
We now come to the case when the objective of the principal is to maximize a social 
welfare function. To keep matters simple we shall restrict attention to schemes in the set 
Q2, i .e. , S = Q2, where Q2 is as defined in (9). 
Let us first consider the case when the welfare function is additive and the social 
utility of an individual's disposable income is strictly increasing, strictly concave and 
the same for all individuals. If the incomes of the taxpayers were costlessly observable, 
the optimal policy would be a hundred percent tax on everyone, the proceeds of which 
are equally distributed in a lump-sum manner. This would lead to the most egalitarian 
distribution of after-tax income. In the presence of costly enforcement, however, welfare 
gains from a more equal distribution must be weighed against the loss in welfare due to 
the corresponding enforcement costs. Thus, we define: 
maximize f! u(y - t(y) + a) g(y) dy 
(t,p,f)EQ2,a?.O 
subject to f! t(y)g(y) dy - cf! p(y) g(y) dy 2': a, 
where u is strictly increasing and strictly concave.12
A scheme (t, p, J) E Q2 is Pareto efficient in Q2 if there is no other scheme (t',p',J') E 
Q2 such that t'(y) -d::; t(y) - a for all y where a'::; f!t'(y) g(y) dy-cf! p'(y) g(y)dy 
and a =  f! t(y) g(y) dy-cf! p(y) g(y) dy. 
10More generally, we may have c(y) > 0 as the cost of verification of income of taxpayer y. As will be
clear from below, such a generalization does not affect our analysis. 
11 Reinganum and Wilde (1985) describe conditions under which a nontrivial net revenue maximizing 
scheme exists and is unique. Scotchmer (1988) and Cremer, Marchand and Pestieau (1990) assume that 
the objective of the 'tax administration' is to maximize net revenue. 
12This is very much like the welfare maximization problem analyzed by Cremer, I\!Iarchand, and 
Pestieau (1990) and Sanchez and Sobel (1993) except that the tax function is not assumed to be linear. 
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This simply says that it should not be possible to increase a taxpayer's disposable income 
without decreasing some other taxpayer's disposable income. Since 0 <:'. t(y) <::: y for 
y E [O, y], a net revenue maximizing scheme, if unique, is Pareto efficient. Of course,
which Pareto efficient scheme is optimal depends on the welfare function. The more 
egalitarian the social welfare function, the larger might be the role of redistributive 
taxation. Therefore, we may also consider optimal schemes by assuming a Rawlsian 
social welfare function. 1 3 That is,
maximize [ min { u(y - t(y) +a)}] 
(t,p,f)EQ2,a?.O Y 
subject to J!t(y)g(y)dy - cf!p(y)g(y)dy 2: a. 
Since 0 <:'. t(y) <:'. y for y E [O, y], this is equivalent to maximizing net revenue a. Thus,
an optimal scheme must be a net revenue maximizing scheme. It was noted earlier that 
a net revenue maximizing scheme is efficient. Thus, we characterize efficient schemes in 
Q1 , and Q2 . 
4 A General Characterization 
From inequalities in (7) and (8) it is seen that 0 <:'. r(y) <:'. t(y) <:'. y for all y. From 
inequalities in (7) it is seen that if p(y) = 1 then r(y) = f(y) and taking t(y) = y will 
have no effect on the incentive constraints in (7) for taxpayer y. However, the incentive 
constraints in (7) for taxpayers other than y would be weaker if t(y) is larger. Thus, in 
view of inequalities in (8), there is no loss of generality in assuming that 
if p(y) = 1, then t(y) = y. (10) 
Ift(y) < y, and p(y) > 0, we can raise t(y) and lower f(y) unless f(y) = 0 such that 
r(y) is not affected. This will not affect the incentive constraints in (7) for taxpayer y but 
will weaken the incentive constraints for taxpayers other than y because t(y) is higher. 
If p(y) = 0, then as seen from (7), f(y) does not matter. Thus as in the case of (10), 
there is no loss of generality in assuming that 
if t(y) < y, then f(y) = 0. (11) 
In order to fix our arguments and avoid discussion of many alternative cases, it is 
13See Stiglitz (1987) for a discussion of the Rawlsian social welfare function in the context of the 
optimal income ta."'{ problem of 1v:Iirrlees and for emphasizing that results may vary greatly v:ith the 
particular welfare function employed. 
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henceforth assumed that if (t,p,f) E Qi, then in addition to (5), (7), and (8) it also
satisfies (10) and (11) . 
Theorem 1 : A scheme ( t, p, f) E Qi with payment function r is efficient in Qi only if 
r and t are nondecreasing. 
Proof We first show that r is nondecreasing. Suppose contrary to the assertion that 
there exist y and y' such that y' > y and r(y') < r(y) . Since r(y) ::; y, from the incentive 
constraints for taxpayer y we have 
r(y) -t(x) p(x) 2: ( ) for all x such that r(y) > t(x) . y - t x
Since r(y') < r(y) and y' > y, the above inequalities imply that 
r(y') - t(x) p(x) > ( ) for all x such that r(y') > t(x) . y' -t x 
This means that the audit probabilities are such that the incentive constraints for tax­
payer y' are nonbinding. We can therefore raise the tax and payment of taxpayer y' such 
that his incentive constraints continue to be nonbinding. Raising the tax and payment 
of taxpayer y' will not affect the incentive constraints in (7) for other taxpayers. There­
fore, keeping the audit probabilities the same, the payment of a taxpayer can be raised 
without lowering the payment of some other taxpayer. This contradicts our supposition 
that ( t, p, J) is efficient. Hence r must be nondecreasing. 
That r is nondecreasing implies that t is nondecreasing. Suppose not, i.e., there exist 
y and y' such that y' > y and t(y') < t(y) . As seen from (8), this means that t(y') < y' 
and thus, in view of (11), f(y') = 0 and r(y') = (1 - p(y') ) t(y') . Since r(y') 2: r(y) as 
shown above, (1 - p(y') ) t(y') 2: (1 -p(y) ) t(y) + p(y)f(y) . And since t(y') < t(y) by
supposition and f(y) 2: 0, we must have p(y') < p(y) . This is, however, a contradiction, 
since as seen from the inequalities in (7), p(y') and p(y) must be such that 
and 
r(z) -t(y') p(y') 2: ( ) for all z such that z > t(y') z - t y' 
r(z) -t(y) p(y) 2: ( ) for all z such that z > t(y) , z-t y
from vvhich it follov s that p(y') 2: p(y) (because r(z) � z for all z and t(y') < t(y) by 
supposition) . Hence t must be nondecreasing. This completes the proof. II 
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Corollary 1.1: If (t,p, f), (t',p', f') E Qi are efficient in Qi and p = p' , then t = t' and
f = f'.i4 
Proof Let r and r' be the corresponding payment functions. If r = r', then in view of 
(11) and p = p', t = t' and f = f'. If r fr', then first note that in view of (11) and 
p = p', r(y) ?: (<::) r'(y) => t(y) ?: (<:: ) t'(y) . Define for each y, t"(y) = max{ t'(y), t(y) }
and r"(y) = ma x{r'(y) , r(y) }. It is easily seen that the scheme (t",p, !") with payment
function r" belongs to Qi and is such that r" ?: r, r" fr (since r fr') which contradicts 
that ( t, p, !) is efficient in Q1• This completes the proof. I 
Corollary 1.2: If (t,p, !) E Q2 is efficient in Q2, then t is nondecreasing. 
Proof The proof is analogous to that of Theorem 1 and hence it is omitted. I 
Theorem 2 : A scheme ( t, p, f) E Q1 with payment function r is efficient in Q1 only if 
r is concave, t is continuous and t(y)/y is nonincreasing, and p is nonincreasing. 
Proof We first show that r must be concave. Suppose not. Let r' be the smallest concave 
function above r. Since by supposition r is not concave, r' ?'. r and r' f r. 
Since r is nondecreasing (as shown in Theorem 1), r' is nondecreasing (see Lemma 0 in 
the Appendix) . Furthermore, since 0 <:: r(z) <:: z for all z, by definition of r', 0 <:: r'(z) <:: z 
for all z. Thus, 0 <:: r(y) <:: r'(y) <:: y for all y. Define t' and f' from r' such that 
r'(y) = (1 -p(y) ) t'(y) + p(y)f'(y), t'(y) ?'. f'(y) ?'. 0, and f'(y) = 0 if t'(y) < y. Clearly,
t'(y)?: t(y) and 0 <:: t'(y) <:: y for all y, since 0 <:: r(y) <:: r'(y) <:: y. Also, t'(y)?: r'(y) for
all y. 
Since ( t, p, !) E Q1 , p must be such that for each x
p(x) ?: sup 
y>t(x) 
Since t'(x)?: t(x) and y ?'. r(y), for each x 
r(y) - t(x) 
y-t(x) 
r(y) -t'(x) r(y) -t(x) 
���� < for all y such that y > t'(x) . 
y-t'(x) - y-t(x)
(12) 
14As noted by Border and Sobel (1987), Corollary 1.1 is in essence similar to the result that in an 
optimal auction, the transfers among the players are completely determined by the probabilities of 
winning the prize (Myerson (1981)). 
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Therefore, for each x 
sup 
y>t'(x) 
We claim that for each x 
sup 
y>t'(x) 
r(y) -t'(x) 
---- < sup y -t'(x) -y>t'(x) 
r'(y) -t'(x) 
y - t'(x) 
::; sup 
y>t'(x) 
r(y) -t(x) 
y - t(x) · 
r(y) -t'(x) 
y - t'(x) · 
(13) 
(14) 
Suppose contrary to the assertion that the expression on the left of (14) is greater than
f3x for some x fixed, where f3x denotes the expression on the right. Since r(y) ::; y for all 
y, f3x::; 1. Define the line lx(y) = t'(x) +f3x(y-t'(x) ) .  Clearly, r lies below the line lx for
y > t'(x) . Since f3x ::; 1 and 0 ::; r(y) ::; y, r also lies below lx for y ::;  t'(x) . Thus all of r
lies below lx. But this contradicts that r' is the smallest concave function above r since if 
f3x is less than the expression on the left of ( 14) then there must be some z > t' ( x) such
that r'(z) > lx(z) , where lx is a linear (and therefore concave) function above r. Hence
we must have 
f3x 2 sup 
y>t'(x) 
r'(y) -t'(x) 
y - t'(x) ' 
which proves (14) . Let t', f' be as defined above from r'. It follows from (12), (13), and
(14) that (t',p', f') with p' = p and payment function r' belongs to Qi. Furthermore,
r' 2 r, and r' f r. This contradicts that ( t, p, f) is efficient in Qi. Hence the payment
function r must be concave. 
Next we show that p must be nonincreasing. Since ( t, p, f) E Qi is efficient in Qi, p
must be such that 
p(x) = sup 
r(y)>t(x) 
r(y) -t(x) 
y -t(x) (15) 
Since t is nondecreasing, the above equality clearly implies that p is nonincreasing. If for 
some x there is no y such that t(x) < r(y) , then since t is nondecreasing we have, in view 
of (7), p(z) = 0 for all z 2 x which again shows that p is nonincreasing. 
From the concavity of r and that p is nonincreasing, we show that t(y)/y is non­
increasing. If t is such that t(y) = y for all y then t(y) / y is nonincreasing. On the 
other hand, let some y be such that t(y) < y. Then, in view of (11) , f(y) = 0 and 
r(y) = (1 - p(y) ) t(y) . Since pis nonincreasing, (1 - p(z)) 2: (1 - p(y)) for all z > y.
Since r is concave, r(z)/z is nonincreasing with z. Therefore, for y' > y 
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and 
r(y') = (l _ p(y') ) t(y') + p(y') f(y') S (l - p(y) ) t(y) = r(y)y' y' y' y y 
(1- p(y') ) :::-:: (1- p(y) ) .
Since f(y') 2: 0, these inequalities imply that t(y')/y' s t(y)/y. Thus, if t(y) < y for 
some y, then t(y') < y' for ally' > y. Since [O, y] is compact ,  there exists a y E [O, y] such
that t(y) < y only for all y > y (or t(y) = y only for all y S y) . This proves that t(y) / y 
is nonincreasing with y. 
Since t is nondecreasing 
Jim t(y - h) slim t(y + h) ; h-<O h-+O 
and since t(y) / y is nonincreasing 
Therefore, 
I. 
t(y -h) 1· t(y + h) 1m > 1m �-� 
1i�o y-h -1i�o y + h 
Jim t(y -h) =lim t(y + h) , 
h_,,O h-+O 
that is, t is continuous. This completes the proof of Theorem 2. II 
Corollary 2.1: If p(x') = p(x) for some x' > x, then either p(x') = p(x) 1 or 
p(x') = p(x) = 0. 
Proof: Since t is nondecreasing, it is seen from (15) that p(x') = p(x) only if either
r(y) = y for some y such that r(y) > t(x') 2: t(x) or if t(x') = t(x). In the first case, (15) 
implies p(x') = p(x) = 1. In the second case, r(x') = r(x) , since r is nondecreasing and 
x' > x 2: t(x) = t(x') . Since r is concave and nondecreasing r(z) = r(x) for all z 2: x. 
Since t(x);:: r(x), there is no y > x such that r(y) > t(x) which as noted earlier ii11plies 
p(x) = 0. Since p is nonincreasing p(x') = 0. Hence the corollary. II 
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Corollary 2.2: For each x there exists a ii E [O,y] such that p(x) = (r(il) -t(x))/(il­
t(x) ) :2: (r(y) -t(x) ) /(y - t(x) ) for all y >  t(x) . 
Proof: Since r is concave, it is continuous over the compact set [O, y]. Thus, the expression
on the right of (15) must attain its supremum at some ii E [ O, y]. Hence the corollary. I
Corollary 2.3: A scheme (t,p, f) E Q2 is efficient in Q2 only if t is concave and p is
. . nonzncreasing. 
In order to interpret our results we display in Figure 1 a scheme which is efficient in
Qi. 
[ FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
The payment function r is shown to be concave and nondecreasing. The tax function 
t is shown to be nondecreasing with nonincreasing average tax rates. The tax function 
is shown to be above the payment function, since t(z) :2: r(z) for all z. The audit 
probability p(x) at x is as defined in (15), and as seen from the figure equal to the
marginal payment rate at a higher point y. Hence, the marginal payment rates determine 
the audit probabilities. 
Figure 2 similarly displays a scheme which is efficient in Q2• The tax and payment
function are shown to be identical. 
[ FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
In order to understand the roll of rewards (or "rebates" ) for truthful reporting, the 
point x and the payment function r in Figure 2 are drawn identically to those in Figure 1. 
It is seen that the audit probability p(x) is higher. It is higher because the tax function 
is not above the payment function. Thus, other things being equal, horizontal equity 
constraints lead to higher audit costs. 
The efficient schemes displayed in Figures 1 and 2 involve random auditing since the
marginal payment rates are strictly between zero and one. Figure 3 displays a scheme 
in which the marginal payment rate is either zero or one. It is seen that for this case 
the audit probabilities as defined in (15) are deterministic, i.e., p(x) E {O, 1}. It  is also
easily seen that this scheme is efficient in both Qi and Q2: it is not possible to decrease
an audit probability without lowering some taxpayer's payment; and it is not possible 
to increase a taxpayer's payment without increasing some audit probability. As in the 
case of efficient schemes that involve random auditing, the audit probabilities in this case 
are also determined by the marginal payment rates. Thus, efficient schemes may involve 
random or deterministic auditing. 
[ FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
The result that the payment and the tax are nondecreasing with income is along the 
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expected lines. The result that the low income tax payers are more likely to be audited 
may seem counter intuitive. However, when interpreted carefully it seems reasonable. 
First it is low income reports and not low income taxpayers that are audited more in­
tensively; low income taxpayers get 'adversely selected'. Secondly, the result applies to 
a population of taxpayers who are otherwise indistinguishable by occupation, residential 
location, source of income, etc. A more careful interpretation of the result is that within 
each category of taxpayers (defined according to exogenously available information on 
other characteristics) a taxpayer is more likely to be audited if he reports low income. 
The result that the payment function r is concave (at least weakly) is explained 
intuitively as follows. Only the downward incentive constraints are relevant and the sole 
purpose of auditing is to deter strategic misreporting. Keeping the taxes high for the low 
income taxpayers deters high income taxpayers from underreporting and thus saves audit 
expenditure. Similarly, relatively less high payments and taxes for high income taxpayers 
weakens their incentives to underreport and save audit expenditure. A concave payment 
function is particularly suitable in both these respects. 
We assumed implicitly that individuals can survive with any positive level of income, 
no matter how small. If there exists a minimum income level a > 0 necessary for survival, 
we can suitably redefine the feasibility requirements for the principal's mechanism such 
that the after-tax income of a taxpayer is never less than&. The revelation principle holds 
and an incentive compatible direct revelation scheme (t, p, f) under the new feasibility
requirements is technically equivalent to a scheme ( t', p, !') E Q1 such that t = t' - a and
f = f' - a. Since subtracting a constant from a function does not alter its qualitative
properties in an essential way, the efficient schemes under the new feasibility requirements 
have more or less the same characteristics. 
We assumed that the agents are risk neutral. We now describe how our results are 
affected when the agents are risk averse, i .e . ,  when all agents have the same von Neumann­
Morgenstern utility function. As noted earlier, the revelation principle holds and we can 
define the corresponding sets of schemes Q1 and Q2 by suitably rewriting the incentive 
constraints in (7). For the efficient schemes in the so-defined set Q2, we obtain a result 
that parallels Theorem 1 or Corollary 1.2. Furthermore, for a class of utility functions 
that satisfy nonincreasing absolute risk aversion and that includes those with constant 
relative risk aversion, we obtain a result that parallels Theorem 2 or Corollary 2.3. The 
techniques of proof are, however, different. The results for efficient schemes in Q1 are 
weaker in that the monotonicity results hold for the case with three possible income levels, 
but that concavity in general does not. The results are weaker in this case because risk 
aversion introduces an important qualitative difference between the schemes in Q1 and 
Q2• For a scheme in Q2, an agent's utility (because of the horizontal equity constraints) 
depends only on his after-tax income. Whereas for a scheme in Q1 an agent's (expected) 
utility, unlike the risk neutral case, depends not only on his (expected) after-tax income, 
but also on the probability of being audited. This introduces an additional complexity 
in the relationship between the audit probabilities and the payment rates and weakens 
the results. 
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We assumed that the audits are perfect, and the principal discovers an agent's true 
income without error. However, as noted by Mookherjee and Png (1990) , continuity 
arguments can be used to generalize the results to the case where there are "small" 
errors in auditing. 
We assumed that a taxpayer can never pay more than his true income. We now con­
sider the implications of weakening this assumption. We assume instead that a taxpayer 
can pay up to fi (the highest income level) but the mechanism for the principal is such
that each taxpayer can submit a report that requires a payment which is not larger than 
his true income and the penalty is never more than the true income of a taxpayer. It is 
easily seen that the revelation principle holds. The inequalities in (8) are modified as 
0:::; f(y) :::; t(y) :::; fj; (8') 
and that 0 :::; r(y) :::; y for all y. The inequalities in (7) are affected only to the extent 
that 't(x) :::; y' in the statement is replaced by 't(x) :::; fi'. Without loss of generality we 
can assume that (10) holds with y on the right replaced by fj, and that 
if t(y) < fi, then f(y) = 0. (11') 
The generalization proposed above is of interest not because it is more realistic to 
assume that a taxpayer can pay more than his income, but because as seen from (8') it 
allows us to consider schemes with nontrivial uniform lump-sum taxes. 
Let Q denote the set of schemes that satisfy (6), suitably modified (7) and (10), (8'), 
and (11'). 
We characterize schemes that are efficient in Q.15 
Theorem 3 : A scheme (t,p, f) E Q with payment function r is efficient in Q only if (a)
r is nondecreasing and concave, t is nondecreasing, and t(y)/y and p are nonincreasing; 
and (b) r(y) = (1- p(y) ) t(y) for all y E [O, fi].
Proof The proof for statement (a) follows from similar arguments as in Theorems 1 and
2, and hence it is omitted. We give proof for statement (b ) . If ( t, p, !) E Q is efficient in
Q, then as in (15) 
p(y) = sup 
r(z)>t(y) 
r(z) - t(y) 
z-t(y) 
(16) 
15It may be noted that Coroiiary 3.1 beiow is unaffected if we repiace (8') by d S f(y) S t(y) s y, 
where -oo < d < 0 is some constant.
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Note that if there is no z such that r(z) > t(y) then we must have p(y) = O, and
therefore r(y) = t(y) . In particular, we must have p(Y) = 0, since t is nondecreasing. 
In view of (11') , we need to show that t(y) < y for all y < y. Suppose not; i.e.,
t(y) = y for some y < y. Since t is nondecreasing, t(x) = y for all x E [ y, y]. But this
implies p(x) = 0 for all x E [y, y] and r(y) = y. This is a contradiction, since (as noted
earlier ) r(y) :":: y. Hence, t(y) < y for all y < y. It was noted earlier that p(y) = O. 
Hence, the theorem. I 
Corollary 3.1: Let (t,p, f) E Q be such t(y) = a for all y where 0 < a < y. Then
(t,p, f) is not efficient in Q. 
Proof Since t(y) = a for all y, it follows from (16) that p(y) = p(y') for all y, y' E [O, y]. 
Therefore, as in Corollary 2.1, either p(y) = 1 for all y or p(y) = 0 for all y. In the first
case, r(y) = (1 - p(y))t(y) = 0 which shows that (t, p, J) is not efficient. In the second 
case, r(y) = a for all y E [O, y] which contradicts that r(y) :":: y for all y E [O, y]. Hence
the corollary. I 
5 Marginal Deterrence and the Efficient Schemes
In our analysis so far, penalties, like taxes and audit probabilities, are determined en­
dogeneously subject only to an upper and a lower bound. We know from the literature 
on economics of crime prevention (Becker (1968) ; and Stigler (1970) ) that endogenous 
determination of penalties gives rise to what is often called the ' Becker conundrum'-it 
is optimal to increase penalties as far as possible and minimize the probability of costly 
auditing. Accordingly, in the present context we have f(x, y) = y for all xi= y. That is, 
the penalty for misreporting, no matter how insignificant, is extreme. This is clearly at 
odds with actual practice in most democratic societies. Stigler (1970) provides a possi­
ble argument as to why penalties may not always be extreme; namely: offenses vary in 
severity and extreme penalties for all offenses would provide no marginal deterrence for 
an offender not to commit a more serious offense. 
From another perspective also it has been argued that it is unrealistic to assume that 
penalties are a choice variable of the 'tax authorities'-penalties, unlike taxes and audit 
probabilities, are determined by social convention and by principles of law which constrain 
them by the common ethical norms of horizontal equity and letting the punishment fit 
the crime. 
We have already analyzed the consequences of imposing the norm of horizontal eq­
uity. The considerations above motivate us to now assume that the penalty function is 
given exogenously. More specifically, we introduce a particular exogenously given penalty 
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function, which emphasizes marginal deterrence or the norm of letting the punishment 
fit the crime. That penalty function is defined as follows: 16 
ft(x, y) = t(x) +max{O, y - x} for all x and y. (17) 
This says that a taxpayer with true income y who reports x and is audited pays the 
tax t(x) and all of the underreported income, and there is no reward for overreporting 
mcome. 
Let R = {(t, p, J) f = fi , O :S t(x) :S x, 0 :S p(x) < 1 for all x}. We characterize
efficient schemes in R. 
Lemma 4: Let (t, p, J) E R  be some scheme. Then there exists an incentive compatible
scheme ( t', p', J') E R such that t' is nondecreasing and ( t', p', J') is equivalent from the
point of view of the principle and each agent when each agent reports his income truthfully. 
This version of the revelation principle does not follow from standard arguments. 
Therefore, a proof, which involves a constructive argument, is given in the Appendix. 
In view of Lemma 4, we confine our attention to schemes that satisfy for each y
if y' > y, then t(y') 2 t(y) ;
0::; p(y) ::; 1; 
0 ::; t(y) ::; y; 
and incentive constraints 
r(y) - t (y) ::; (1- p(x) ) t(x) + p(x)(t(x) + y - x)
= t(x) + p(x)(y -x) for all x < y.
Let S denote the set of schemes (t, p, J) ER that satisfy (18) to (21) .
(18) 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
16More appropriately, the penalty function is defined as J,(x,y) = min{t(x),y} + max{O,y - x} for 
all x and y. But this distinction, as can be seen from below, does not matter. One could have also
considered f(x, y) = t(x) + max{O, (1 + K)(t(y) - t(x))} for all x and y where K > 0 is the exogeneously
given 'penalty rate'. But this one implies a penalty which is more than the true income of a taxpayer 
for at least the tax function defined as t(x) = x for all x. 
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Theorem 5: A scheme (t,p,f) ES is efficient in S only if t is concave and nonde­
creasing and p is nonincreasing. 
Proof Since ( t, p, J) E S, t is nondecreasing, and for each x
t(y) - t(x) p(x) 2 sup 2 0. y>x y -X (22) 
Suppose contrary to the assertion that ( t, p, f) is efficient but t is not concave. Let t' 
be the smallest concave function above t such that t' 2 t, t' # t. By Lemma 0, t' is 
nondecreasing, and by definition oft', 0::; t'(z) ::; z for all z. Define 
We claim that 
'( ) t'(y) - t'(x) p x =sup . y>x y-X 
f t(y) -t(x) p (x) :S:sup . y>x y - X 
(23) 
(24) 
Suppose not, i.e. , p'(x) > f3x for some x fixed, where f3x denotes the expression on the
right of (24) . Consider the line lx(Y) = t'(x) + f3x(Y -x). Since t'(x) 2 t(x) , it follows
from the definition of f3x that lx(Y) 2 t(y) for all y 2 x. On the other hand, concavity 
of t' implies that lx(Y) 2 t'(y) for all y < x and lx(Y) < t'(y) for at least one y > x,
since by supposition f3x < p'(x) . Thus, lx(Y) 2 t'(y) 2 t(y) for all y <  x. Hence, lx is
a linear function above t, and lx(Y) < t'(y) for at least some y > x. Let k denote the
function defined as k(y) -inf{t'(y) , lx(Y)} .  Then, k is a concave function above t such 
that k(y) < t'(y) for some y > x. But this contradicts the fact that t' is the smallest
concave function above t. Hence (24) must be true. 
Consider the scheme (t',p', f') ,  where f' = j,,. Then (t',p', f') ES. Thus, (t',p', f') E 
S is such that r' 2 r, r' # r, and p' ::; p. But this contradicts our supposition that ( t, p, f) 
is efficient in S. Hence t must be concave. 
From concavity of t we show that p is nonincreasing. Since ( t, p, f) E S is efficient in
S, p must be such that for each x 
t(y) -t(x) p(x) =sup . y>x y -X 
(25) 
Since tis concave, the supremum is attained at y = x, i.e. p(x) = D+t(x )-the rigl1t l-1and 
derivative of t at x-which is equal to the derivative if t is differentiable at x which it is 
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at almost all x because it is concave. Since t is concave, p must be nonincreasing. This 
completes the proof. II 
Corollary 5.1: If (t,p, f) ES is efficient in S, then for each x,p(x) = D+t(x) .
Let Dt(x) denote the derivative of t at x whenever it exists. Let G denote the 
distribution function, i.e., G(x) =ft g(z) dz. Let c > 0 be the cost per audit.
Corollary 5.2: If (t,p, !) E S is efficient in S, then the net revenue corresponding to
(t,p, f) is J! Dt(x) (l -G(x) - cg(x) ) dx.
Proof Since r = t, in view of Corollary 5.1 the net revenue corresponding to (t,p, f) is
J! t(x) g(x) dx -cf! Dt(x) g(x) dx
(integrating by parts, which is legitimate since 
t is concave and therefore absolutely continuous) 
= t(f}) - J! Dt(x) G(x) dx - cf! Dt(x) g(x) dx
= J! Dt(x)(l - G(x) -cg(x) ) dx.
This completes the proof. II 
That the supremum of the expression on the right of (25) is attained at y = x means
that the local downward incentive constraints are in general binding in an efficient scheme 
in s.i7 As noted earlier, only downward incentive constraints are in general binding in
an efficient scheme in Qi or Q2. What is the crucial difference between schemes in S and 
those in Qi or Q2 that gives rise to this result? It seems that it comes from the marginal 
deterrence aspect of the penalty function-if the audit probabilities are high enough for 
deterring misreporting by small amounts then they are also high enough for deterring 
misreporting by large amounts. 
[ FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
An efficient scheme in S is displayed in Figure 4. For the sake of comparison the point 
x and the payment/tax function are drawn identically to those in Figures 1 and 2. It 
is seen that audit probability p(x) is higher. Thus, penalties that emphasize marginal 
deterrence lead to higher audit costs. It is easily seen that the scheme displayed in Figure 
3 is efficient in S also. Therefore, it is not surprising that deterministic schemes, as noted 
in footnote 3, have shown up in a variety of contexts. 
Corollary 5.2 shows how the net revenue corresponding to an efficient scheme (t,p, f) E 
S may be calculated. Therefore, numerical calculations for comparison purposes are 
17This is simiiar to resuits in the auction design problem (Maskin and Riiey (1984); and Myerson 
(1981)) and in the theory of bilateral trade (Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)). 
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possible. This corollary can also be used to prove the existence and uniqueness of net 
revenue maximizing schemes, which as noted earlier are Pareto efficient. 
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have developed a general approach to characterizing optimal income 
tax enforcement. Our results clarify the nature of the interplay between tax rates, audit 
probabilities, and penalties for misreporting. For a variety of objective functions for the 
principal, the optimal income tax schedule is in general concave (at least weakly) and 
monotonic. The marginal payment rates determine the audit probabilities; and less harsh 
penalties lead to higher enforcement costs. In many ways our results mirror Mirrlees' 
results, particularly the seemingly ubiquitous regressivity of optimal income taxes. 
What are we to conclude from these results? We do not think that regressive taxes 
can ever be advocated or voted for in a democratic society. However, our analysis does 
show that there exists a tradeoff between equity and efficiency considerations; a tradeoff 
that must be taken into account in the choice of tax policy. Our results provide less 
support for progressive taxes than what one might have hoped. 
We restricted our analysis to the case when the agents are risk neutral. However, as 
already mentioned, in a later paper we will extend some of our results to the case when 
the agents are risk averse. 
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Appendix 
We establish the two lemmata that were used in the analysis above. 
Lemma 0: Let r : [O, y] -+ R be a nondecreasing function. Let r' : [O, y] ---+ R be the
smallest concave function above r. Then r' is nondecreasing. 
Proof Since r' is concave, 
r'(x) = 1x 7(z)dz (26) 
for a nonincreasing function 'Y· In fact, 7(z) = Dr'(z)-the derivative of r' at z-whenever 
the derivative exists. Suppose for x1 < x2, r'(x1) > r'(x2) . Then, using (26) (i.e., 
concavity) , it follows that r'(y) :S: r'(x2) for all y 2". x2 because 7(x2) :<; 0 implies 
7(y) :S: 0 for all y >  x2 and r'(y) :S: r'(x2) by (26). Now let 5 = r'(x2). We claim r(z) :<; 5 
for all z: for z :S: x2, r(z) :S: r(x2) :S: r'(x2) = 5; and for z > x2, r(z) :S: r'(z) :<; r'(x2) = 5. 
Hence, the function k defined as k(x) = inf {r'(x) , 5} is concave and such that r :<; k :<; r' 
with k cf r'. This contradicts the fact that r' is the smallest concave function above r.
This proves the lemma. 
Proof of Lemma 4: We first show that without loss of generality we can take t to be 
nondecreasing. Let y, z E [O, y] be such that y < z and t(y) > t(z) . Then, since f = ft>
no agent will report income to be y. Suppose the tax and audit probability corresponding 
to y are changed such that they are equal to those corresponding to z. Such a change in 
the tax and audit probability corresponding to y will not induce agents above y to change 
their optimal reports, and will make agent y and agents below y indifferent between y 
and z. Since the tax and audit probability at y are now the same as those at z, this will 
neither affect the payments of the agents nor the audit costs. Thus, we can take t to be 
nondecreasing. 
Given ( t, p, f) E R and t nondecreasing, we define a scheme ( t', p', f') from ( t, p, f)
as follows: t'(y) = t(a(y)) + p(a(y)) (y - a(y) ) ,p'(y) = p(a(y) ) ,  and f' = j,, , where
a(y) (:S: y) is an optimal report of agent y. 
We first show that t' is nondecreasing. By definition of t', t'(z) = t( a(z) + p(a(z) )(z -
a(z)) and t'(y) = t(a(y)) + p(a(y)) (y - a(y) ) .  Suppose z > y. Then, (a) if a(z) 2". y, 
then clearly t'(z) 2". t(a(z)) 2". t(y) 2". t(a(y)) + p(a(y)) (y - a(y)) (by optimality of a(y) 
and that t is nondecreasing); and (b) if a(z) < y, then t(a(z)) + p(a(z) ) (z - a(z)) > 
t(a(z)) + p(a(z)) (y - a(z)) 2". t(a(y)) + p(a(y) ) (y - a(y)) (from the fact that a(y) is
optimal for agent y) . This proves that t' is nondecreasing. 
Clearly, 0 :<; t'(y) :<; t(y) :<:: y and 0 :<:: p'(y) :<:: 1 for each y. Thus, (t' ,p', f') E R.
We show that (t', p', f') is incentive compatible. Since t' is nondecreasing (as shown) ,  we 
need to show that for each y, t(y) :S: t;(x) + p;(x)(y - x) for all x < y. That is, for each 
24 
y and x < y, t(a(y) ) + p(a(y) ) (y-a(y)) <:: t'(x) + p'(x)(y -x) = t(a(x)) + p(a(x) ) (x -
a(x)) + p(a(x) ) (y -x) = t(a(x) ) + p(a(x) ) (y -a(x) ) .  This is indeed true, since a(y) is 
optimal for agent y, and a ( x) <; x. 
This proves that (t',p', J') E R is an incentive compatible scheme. It is easily seen
that ( t', p', J') and ( t, p, f) are equivalent from the point of view of the principle and each 
agent. 
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